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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
A. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the Appeal in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (i) (1953 as amended) and Rule 
3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
B. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an Appeal from Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
filed March 18, 1987 and a subsequent Decree of Dissolution and 
Judgment entered May 20, 1987. The Judgment directs that a limited 
partnership, C & C Development, be Dissolved and that the assets of 
the partnership be sold after May 22, 1988, if not reacquired by 
Appellant, the general partner. The Complaint in this matter was 
filed on April 23, 1985, seeking to foreclose a trust deed or 
dissolve the partnership. At the conclusion of the trial, held May 
24, 1985, the Trial Court refused to foreclose the trust deed but 
ordered the partnership dissolved. 
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II 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR PKVlKW 
1. Did the Trial Court err when it determined that the Limited 
Partnership Agreement entered into by the parties was "unambiguous" 
concerning its provisions regarding Respondent's initial capital 
contributions and Respondent's entitlement to an increase in his 
partnership interest for additional capital contributions and, 
should the contract and the parties' conduct be interpreted by this 
Court to mean that Respondent's payment of the first Trust Deed Note 
due First Security Bank in Cedar City, Iron County, Utah was an 
initial capital contribution, as suggested by Appellant, instead of 
an additional capital contribution, as suggested by Respondent and, 
based on the finding that the Agreement was unambiguous, as found by 
the Trial Court. 
2. Did the Court err when it refused to permit Appellant to 
present expert evidence by an accountant concerning the 
reasonableness and the financial implications of Respondents 
interpretation of the limited partnership agreement as those matters 
related to the issue of the parties1 intent. 
3. Did the Trial Court err when it determined that the 
Appellant had willfully breached the Partnership Agreement. 
4. Did the Trial Court err when it determined, as a matter of 
fact, that Respondent owned 125% of the partnership assets, and, as 
a matter of law, that, by reason of ownership of in excess of 125? 
of the partnership assets, the Respondent was the sole owner and 
partner of the partnership so that "a partnership can not really 
exist, and the partnership should be dissolved." 
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5. Did the Trial Court err when it determined that the 
appropriate interest rate for the "reacquisition cost" should be 
1.5% over the State Bank of Southern Utah prime lending rate. 
Ill 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Ann. §48-1-29 (1953) 
(1) On application by or for a partner the Court shall 
decree a dissolution whenever: 
(a) A partner has been declared a lunatic in any 
judicial proceeding or shown to be of unsound mind. 
(b) A partner becomes in any other way incapable of 
performing his part of the partnership contract. 
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as 
tends to prejudicially affect the caring on of the 
business. 
(d) A partner willfully or persistingly commits a 
breach of the partnership agreement, or otherwise so 
conducts himself in matters relating to the 
partnership business that it is not reasonably 
practical to carry on the business in partnership 
with him. 
(e) The business of the partnership can only be 
carried on at a loss. 
If) Other circumstances render a dissolution 
equitable. 
Utah Code Ann. §48-2-1 (1953) 
A Limited Partnership is a partnership formed by two or 
more persons under the provisions of the next section, 
having as members one or more general partners and one or 
moie limited partners. The limited partners as such shall 
not be bound by the obligations of the partnership. 
Utah Code Ann. §48-2-2 (1953) 
See Addendum 
Utah Code Ann. §48-2-4 (1953) 
The"contribution of a limited partner may be cash or other 
property, but not services. 
Utah Code Ann. §48-2-12 (1953) 
A person may be a general partner and a limited partner in 
the same partnership at the same time. A person who is a 
general and also at the same time a limited partner shall 
have all the rights and powers and be subject to all the 
restrictions of a general partner, except that in respect 
to his contribution he shall have the rights against the 
other members which he would have had if he were not also 
a general partner. 
Utah Code Ann. §48-2-15 (1953) 
A limited partner may receive from the partnership the 
share of the profits, or the compensation by way of 
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income, stipulated for in the certificate; provided, that 
after such payment is made, whether from the property of 
the partnership or that of a general partner, the 
partnership assets are in excess of all liabilities of the 
partnership, except liabilities to limited partners on 
account of their contributions and to general partners. 
Utah Code Ann, §48-2-16 (1953) 
(1) A limited partner shall not receive from a general 
partner or out of partnership property any part of his 
contribution until: 
(a) All liabilities of the partnership, except 
liabilities to general partners and to limited 
partners on account of their contributions, have been 
paid or there remains property of the partnership 
sufficient to pay them; 
Utah Code Ann. §48-2-23 (1953). 
(1) In settling accounts after dissolution the 
liabilities of the partnership shall be entitled to 
payment in the following order: 
(a) Those to creditors, in the order of priority as 
provided by law, except those to limited partners on 
account of their contributions, and to general 
partners. 
(b) Those to limited partners, in respect to their 
share of the profits and other compensation by way of 
incomes on their contributions. 
(c) Those to limited partners, in respect to the 
capital of their contributions. 
(d) Those to general partners, other than for 
capital and profits. 
(e) Those to general partners, in respect to 
profits. 
(f) Those to general partners, in respect to 
capital. 
(2) Subject to any statement in the certificate, or to 
subsequent agreement, limited partners share in the 
partnership assets in respect to their claims fci capital 
and in respect to their claims for profits or for 
compensation by way of income on their contributions 
respectively in proportion to the respective amounts of 
such claims. 
IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 19, 1982, the Respondent and Appellant entered into a 
Limited Partnership Agreement. The Limited Partnership Agreement 
was prepared by Attorney J. Phillip Eves of Cedar City, Utat 
(Transcript of trial, hereinafter "Transcript," at 40). Mr. Eves 
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was hired to prepare the Agreement by Respondent (Transcript at 159, 
185) and the Limited Partnership Agreement was recorded on May 24, 
1983, at the request of Respondent (Transcript at 180). The 
Appellant is the General Partner of the limited Partnership and 
Respondent is the sole Limited Partner. 
The Limited Partnership Agreement sets forth the capital 
contributions of the General Partner and the Limited Partner and 
provides that the Limited Partner should contribute additional 
capital upon request of the General Partner in return for which the 
Limited Partner would receive a 1% interest in the Partnership for 
every additional $1,000 contributed. The General Partner was 
given an option to reduce the Limited Partner's ownership interest 
by paying to the Limited Partner, at any time within 5 years, all or 
part of the Limited Partner's contribution, plus interest at 1.5% 
over the "piime interest rate." It the General Partner only paid a 
portion of the Limited Partner's investment, then he would be 
entitled to a reduction of 1% for every $1,000 of the Limited 
Partner's contribution repaid. 
The agreement also contained provisions prohibiting the General 
Partner from encumbering "the property without prior written consent 
of the Limited Partner", a provision prohibiting the General Partner 
from engaging "directly or indirectly in any business in competition 
with the business of the Partnership," a provision prohibiting the 
Limited Partner from any "active [role] in the conduct of the 
Partnership's business" and a provision that the General Partner 
"shall be entitled to no salary for services rendered by him." The 
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term of the Partnership is for 20 years from the date of execution 
of the agreement or until dissolved by operation of law. (See Trial 
exhibit D-l, the original Limited Partnership Agreement). 
Interpretation of the Limited Partnership Agreement was one of 
the principal issue presented to the Court for decision at trial. 
From the date the Partnership was formed until the date of 
trial, Appellant acted as General Partner. (Record at 284). During 
that period of time, he paid to his wife a management fee for 
services provided by her in managing the Partnership property 
(Transcript at 71-72) . That property consisted of a mobile home 
park and RV park. Appellant purchased tires for a motor vehicle not 
owned by the Partnership (Transcript at 70) and paid for his real 
estate license with money generated by the Partnership (Transcript 
at 73) . 
On or about May 20, 1983, the Respondent paid off an 
encumbrance on the Partnership property in the form of a Trust Deed 
Note payable to First Security Bank in the amount o± $92,717.27 
(Transcript at 22-23, 50 and Trial Exhibit P-10). Respondent 
maintained at trial that payment of that obligation was an 
additional capital contribution entitling Respondent to an 
additional interest in the partnership assets of 1% per $1,000.00 of 
the obligation paid (Transcript at 61) . However, Appellant 
considered the payment of that obligation a fullfillment of 
Respondent's obligation under the initial capital contribution 
portion of the Limited Partnership Agreement (Transcript at 16 9 and 
Trial Exhibit P-16) . 
On or about May 23, 1983, Appellant signed a Promissory Note 
secured by a Trust Deed, promising to pay to Respondent the sum of 
$132,535.54 plus interest at the rate of 14.5% per annum (Transcript 
at 36-37 and Trial Exhibit P-l, the Promissory Note). The Note was 
secured by the real property which is the major partnership asset 
(See Trial Exhibits Dl and P-2) . The $132,5135.54 represented the 
total of monies paid by Respondent to or on behalf of the 
Partnership on or prior to May 23, 1983 (Transcript at 51). 
In January of 1985, Respondent asked for the first time to see 
the books and records of the partnership (Transcript at 69). 
Respondent repeated the request for a week (Transcript at 69) and 
was provided the general ledger by Appellant's counsel (Transcript 
at 67, 69). 
During the first part»of April, 1985, Appellant was served with 
a Summons, Affidavit and Motion for Writ of Replevin. (Record at 
36-38). The Complaint asked that the Trust Deed, signed May 23, 
1983, be foreclosed as a Note and Mortgage or, in the alternative, 
that the Partnership be dissolved (Record at 8-9) . The hearing on 
the Motion for Writ of Replevin was held on the 26th day of April, 
1985 (Record at 96) . At that hearing, the Trial Court set the 
matter for a May 24, 1985, non-jury trial on tlhe merits despite a 
request by Appellant's counsel that he be granted at least 60 days 
within which to prepare for trial (Transcript of April 26, 1985 
hearing at 23-28). 
The trial was held in this matter on the 24th da^ of May, 1985. 
Witnesses were called, sworn and testified. In an effort to present 
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evidence concerning the intention of the parties, Appellant 
attempted to introduce evidence from an accountant regarding the 
reasonableness of Respondent's interpretation of the financial 
aspects of the Limited Partnership Agreement. The Court refused to 
allow that testimony to be presented (Transcript at 144-147) . 
Following the presentation of evidence, the Court denied 
Respondent's request to foreclose the Trust Deed as a mortgage, 
"(Transcript at 203-205) but granted Respondent's request for a 
dissolution of the Partnership (Transcript at 208) . The Court 
determined, as a matter of law, that since the Respondent owned all 
of the assets of the Partnership, pursuant to the Court's 
interpretation of the Partnership Agreement, the Limited Partnership 
"cannot really exist and . . . should be dissolved" (Transcript 
at 204, Record at 280). 
Respondent prepared Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
a Decree of Dissolution and Judgment. Appellant objected to the 
proposed Findings. Several copies of Findings and a Judgment were 
submitted to the Court and the merits of each argued. Finally, in 
April of 1987, the Court signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law (Record at 290) . In May, the Court signed a Decree of 
Dissolution and Judgment, incorporating in that document parts of 
documents submitted by counsel for Appellant and counsel for 
Respondent (Record at 311). In essence, the Court ruled that 
Respondent owned 125% of the Partnership assets at the time of 
trial, so the Partnership could not exist and should be dissolved. 
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V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appropriate standard of review in examining the Trial 
Court's interpretation of a written contract depends in part on 
whether the contract is determined to be ambiguous or not. If the 
contract is unambiguous then interpretation of the contract is a 
question of law and the Supreme Court is not required to give any 
deference to the Trial Court's opinion. If, however, the contract 
is ambiguous and the Trial Court finds facts respecting the 
intentions of the parties based on extringent evidence, then review 
by the Supreme Court is limited and the evidence must be viewed by 
the Supreme Court in a light most supportive of the findings of the 
Trial Court. In this case, the Trial Court eventually found that 
the contract was unambiguous despite allowing the presentation of 
extrinsic evidence concerning the partieis' intent because 
"obviously there is an ambiguity." Despite the Trial Court's 
finding, the contract was ambiguous with reference to the 
charactarization of Respondent's payment of a Trust Deed Note to 
First Security Bank as an initial or an additional capital 
contribution. 
In light of the evidence presented at triall, the Trial Court's 
failure to make any findings concerning the parties' intent based on 
the extrisic evidence presented, and the Trial Court's exclusion of 
evidence offered by Appellant concerning the reasonableness and 
financial implications of the interpretation of the contract 
eventually adopted by the Court, this Court should determine that 
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the payment of the first trust deed note by Respondent was in 
fullfiilment of Respondent's obligations to use his best efforts to 
substitute himself as the obligor on that Note and therefore an 
initial capital contribution instead of an additional capital 
contribution. 
At trial Respondent testified ccnderning several incidents 
which he attempted to characterize as breaches of the Limited 
Partnership Agreement by Appellant. The Court found as a matter of 
fact that the Appellant had kept the books and records of the 
partnership in a fashion that violated the partnership agreement and 
willfully breached the partnership agreement by retaining funds of 
the partnership and applying them to his own use as well as 
expending partnership resources in matters not furthering the 
partnership interest. However, when each of those instances is 
examined and the testimony with reference to each issue evaluated it 
is apparent that, even in light of the standard of review 
appropriate to factual findings by the Trial Court, the factual 
finding of willful breach can not be supported by the evidence. 
The Trial Court determined as a matter of law that, because 
Respondent owned 125% of the partnership assets, a partnership could 
no longer exist. The Trial Court ignored the application of limited 
partnership law to this controversy. There is no requirement that a 
general partner make any captial contribution to the assets of the 
partnership. A limited partnership can continue to exist even where 
the limited partners' interest entitles him or them to all of the 
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assets of the partnership and the general patftner has no percentage 
interest in the assets of the limited partnership at all. 
The Trial Court's factual determination that there was a 
willful breach of the partnership agreement and that Court's legal 
determination that the partnership agreement could not exist since 
the Limited Partner's interest in the partnership encompassed all of 
the partnership assets is not supported by the facts or the law. 
The Decree of Dissolution should therefore be set aside and 
Appellant restored to his position as General Partner of the Limited 
Partnership, C & C Development. 
There is no evidence in the record to support the Trial Court's 
finding that the interest rate that should be applied to Appellant's 
costs to reacquire the partnership assets should be 1.5% over the 
prime rate of State Bank of Southern Utah. The contract merely 
provides that the interest rate should be 1.5% over the prime rate. 
The appropriate prime rate should be the lesser of the "prime rates" 
in effect at the time interest is computed since there was no 
evidence presented at trial that the parties specifically agreed to 
the State Bank of Southern Utah prime rate. There is insufficient 
evidence to support the finding by the Court th&t the prime lending 
rate of State Bank of Southern Utah should apply. The only finding 
that can therefore be supported by the evidence is that a prime rate 
was to be used to calculate the intereist on Appellant's 
reacquisition costs. In the absence of any evidence as to a higher 
interest rate, the appropriate finding would be that the lower of 
the prime interest rates in existence at the time interest is being 
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calculated would be the appropriate interest rate to be included in 
the Court's Judgement. 
VI 
ARGUMENT 
A. PAYMENT BY RESPONDENT OF THE FIRST TRUST DEED OBLIGATION 
TO FIRST SECURITY BANK WAS AN INITIAL CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION, NOT 
AN ADDITIONAL CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION. 
Interpretation of contract language presents to the Supreme 
Court a question of law on which the Court need not defer to the 
Trial Court's construction. The reviewing Court is free to render 
its independant interpretation. Faulkner v. Farnsworth 714 P2nd 
1149 (Utah 1986) . The Supreme Court is obligated to give deference 
to the Trial Court's findings only if the contract is ambiguous and 
the Trial Court finds facts respecting the intentions of the parties 
based on extrinsic evidence. Kimball v. Campbell 699 P2nd 714 (Utah 
1985) . 
In this case the Trial Court ruled that the Limited Partnership 
Agreement was "unambiguous" (Record at 2 86). This Court would be 
free to render its own interpretation of the Agreement if 
unambiguous or would be obligated to give deference to the Tirial 
Court's factual findings as to the parties' intent, based on 
extrinsic evidence, had the Trial Court determined that the 
Agreement was ambiguous and then made factual findings concerning 
the intent of the parties. However, in light of the Trial Court's 
erroneous ruling that the Agreement is unambiguous and that Court's 
failure to make any factual findings concerning the intentions of 
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the parties, this Court should consider the evidence in the record 
and determine the parties' intent from that evidence in interpreting 
the terms of the Agreement which relate to initial and additional 
capital contributions. 
A critical issue presented for determination by this Court is 
whether Respondent's payment of the First TrUst Deed obligation to 
First Security Bank was an initial or an additional capital 
contribution. Resolution of that issue requires an interpretation 
of ambiguous and conflicting provisions of thle Limited Partnership 
Agreement as well as a consideration of extrinsic evidence 
concerning the parties intent when the Limited Partnership Agreement 
was drafted. 
Respondent hired Attorney J. Phillip Eves to prepare the 
Limited Partnership Agreement (Transcript at 1519) , Mr. Eves prepared 
the Agreement from a document he believed had been prepared by 
Respondent (Transcript at 185), Respondent paid Mr. Eves for 
preparing the document (Transcript at 185) and Respondent asked Mr. 
Eves to record the Limited Partnership Agreement (Transcript at 
180). Pursuant to the well settled rule governing interpretation of 
ambiguous contracts that, "In case of doubt or ambiguity a contract 
will be construed most strongly against the party who drew or 
prepared it, or whose attorney drew or prepared it" (17 Am Jur 2d 
Contracts §276 at 690), the ambiguities in this Limited Partnership 
should be construed most strongly against Respondent as the party 
whose Attorney prepared it. 
The Limited Partnership Agreement awards Respondent a 20% 
interest in the partnership for, among ether things, using "best 
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efforts" to substitute himself as obligor on a First Trust Deed Note 
to First Security Bank and then appears to award Respondent a 95% 
interest if he pays a uniform real estate contract, of which the 
First Trust Deed is a major portion. In light of the apparent 
ambiguity as to the percentage interest in the Partnership assets to 
which Respondent is entitled upon actual payment of the First Trust 
Deed Note, this Court should consider the extrinsic evidence 
presented at trial concerning the parties1 intentions in order to 
determine whether JRespondent should be awarded 20% of the 
Partnership assets for payment of that obligation as an inititial 
capital contribution or 95% if payment of that debt were 
characterized as an additional capital contribution. 
In order to determine whether Respondent was entitled to credit 
for an additional capital contribution upon payment of the First 
Trust Deed Note, the Court should first determine whether Respondent 
had done all that was required to entitle him to the initial 20% 
interest. The only issue in dispute at trial with regard to 
Respondent's entitlement to the full initial capital contribution 
percentage concerned Respondent's performance of paragraph 6B of the 
Agreement. That paragraph provides: 
The LIMITED PARTNER hereby agrees to make initial capital 
contributions to the PARTNERSHIP as follows: 
B. To use his best efforts to substitute himself in place of 
the Country Aire Estates, a California Limited Partnership, on 
a 1st Trust Deed Note between Country Aire Estates and First 
Security Bank in Cedar City, Iron County, Utah, which 1st Trust 
Deed Note covers the real property described under paragraph 5 
above. 
Respondent testified at trial that he had made an effort to 
fulfil the requirements of paragraph 6B (Transcript at 57-59) and 
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that Appellant and he had determined not to go through with the 
substitution on the obligation because the Bank wanted a higher 
interest rate to rewrite the note (Transcript at 59) . Respondent 
also testified that he understood that payment of the First Trust 
Deed Note to First Security Bank was an additional capital 
contribution pursuant to the second paragraph A ih Section 6 of the 
Limited Partnership Agreement (Transcript at 61-62). That paragraph 
provides: 
LIMITED"PARTNER also agrees to contribute additional cash or 
property as capital for the use of the PARTNERSHIP for the 
following purposes, should the GENERAL PARTNER request said 
contribution: 
A. Payment of the amount due on an unrecorded Real Estate 
Contract with a present balance of approximately NINETY FIVE 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($95,500.00) which Contract covers the 
sale of the real property described in paragraph 5 hereof from 
Country Aire Estates, a California Limited Partnership, to 
MURLAN"* D. CARTER, the GENERAL PARTNER herein, which Contract 
bears payments of TWELVE HUNDRED AND NINE DOLLARS AND THIRTY 
EIGHT CENTS ($1,209.38) per month with the entire balance due 
in 1983. The payment of this Contract obligation will 
discharge and purchase money obligation owing against the 
property described in paragraph 5 hereinabove by paying off the 
unrecorded Real Estate Contract and the 1st Trust Deed Note 
described in paragraph 6 (B) above. 
Appellant testified at trial that Respondent refused to provide 
financial information and documentation required by the Bank before 
it would agree to the substitution of Respondent as obligor on the 
note (Transcript at 168-169) , that he did not agree to release 
Respondent from the obligations assumed pursuant to paragraph 6B 
(Transcript at 169) and that, in lieu of performing the obligations 
assumed pursuant to paragraph 6B, Respondent paid off the note 
(Transcript at 169) , entitling Respondent to an approximately 20% 
interest in the Partnership, the same amount to which he would have 
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been entitled had he followed through and fulfilled the requirements 
of paragraph 6B. 
Appellant's testimony concerning that issue is the more 
reasonable since, had Respondent been successful in his efforts to 
substitute as the obligor on the First Security Bank debt, 
Respondent would have relieved the Partnership and Appellant of the 
responsibility to pay that obligation. Respondent's actual payment 
of the obligation was nothing more than a substitute performance for 
failure or refusal to complete obligations assumed pursuant to the 
initial contribution section of the Limited Partnership Agreement. 
Not only does the apparent intent of the parties to the 
Agreement support Appellant's position that the payment of the 
obligation to First Security Bank was an initial contribution but 
the economic realities of the entire transaction support that view 
as well. 
The partnership property, a Mobile Home Park and R.V. Park in 
Cedar City Utah, was worth at least $525,000.00 in 1979, according 
to testimony by Respondent's expert witness who testified that the 
value of the property had declined since that time (Transcript at 
15-17). According to Appellant's testimony, the value of the 
partnership property in 1982 was in excess of $600,000.00 
(Transcript at 142). Appellant had assigned a value to the 
partnership property of $556,000.00 at the time the Limited 
Partnership came into existence (Trial Exhibit P-13) and Respondent 
acknowledged that Appellant had maintained that the property was 
-17-
worth $800,000.00 from that time on. The only evidence suggested by 
Respondent that the property was not worth at least $500,000.00 in 
1982 was testimony by an appraiser that the value at the time of 
trial was $312,760.00. However, that testimony had little or 
nothing to do with the value of the property ih 1982 and, certainly 
the provision in the Agreement that the property was worth at least 
$100,000.00 does not contradict the other evidence concerning a 
value that is at least and, in fact, in excess of that amount. 
Were the Respondent to have done what Respondent contractually 
obligated himself to do, Respondent would have relieved the 
Partnership and Appellant of approximately $112,000.00 in debt and 
provided the security for the improvement bond. Having done so, the 
Respondent would be entitled to an approximately 20% interest in the 
partnership. $112,000.00 is far closer to 20% of $556,000.00 than 
is $17,000.00. The interpretation suggested hfy Respondent simply 
makes no sense in light of the value of the parties1 respective 
contributions to the Partnership. 
In light of the rule that ambiguities in a contract should be 
construed most strongly against the party who prepared the contract 
and in light of the economic reality of the parties1 relationship, 
including their respective contributions to the Partnership, the 
reasonable interpretation of the Agreement and Respondent's payment 
of the First Security Bank debt is that payment of that debt was an 
initial contribution, not an additional contribution. Respondent's 
payment of that debt did not entitle him to an additional 92% 
interest in the Partnership. Respondent was entitled to 20% for 
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fulfilling his obligations to provide the initial capital 
contribution, including retiring that debt, and no more. 
B. NEITHER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL NOR THE LAW 
GOVERNING LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS SUPPORT THE DECREE OF DISSOLUTION 
IN THIS CASE. 
1 . There was insufficient evidence presented at trial to 
support a factual finding by the Trial Court that Appellant had 
willfully breached the Partnership Agreement, a necessary 
prerequisite to a determination that the Partnership should be 
judicially dissolved. 
With reference to the Court's finding that the Appellant 
willfully breached the agreement, the standard for review by the 
Supreme Court is to grant some degree of deference to the findings 
of the Trial Court with regard to factual matters, including, as in 
this case, a finding that Appellant willfully breached the 
Partnership Agreement. 
In Harline vs. Campbell 728 P.2nd 980 (Utah 1986) the Court 
reaffirmed the rule that the factual findings of the Trial Court 
will not be disturbed unless there is no substantial record in the 
evidence to support them. In that case, the Court indicated thctt, 
in order to obtain review of a factual finding of the Trial Court, 
the Appellant must marshall all evidence in support of the Trial 
Court's finding and then demonstrate that even when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the factual determination made by the Trial 
Court, the evidence is insufficient to support its findings. Even 
with that standard of review, the Trial Court's determination that 
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the Appellant willfully breached the Limited Partnership Agreement 
is error and must be reversed. 
With regard to the Court's finding of a willful breach of the 
contract, Respondent presented testimony and argument concerning 
13 instances of alleged wrongdoing on Appellant's part. These 
include: 1) that Appellant never prepared a Deed conveying his 
property into the Partnership (Transcript at 56); 2) That 
Appellant did not provide Partnership tax returns to Respondent for 
the years 1982, 1983, and 1984 (Transcript at 66); 3) That 
Appellant did not volunteer the books and records of the Partnership 
for Respondent's review until January of 1985 (Transcript at 67); 
4) That Appellant kept no checking account for the Partnership 
(Transcript at 68) ; 5) That Appellant refused to let Respondent 
see the checking account and invoices for a fuHl week in January of 
1985, despite a request by Respondent to review the documents 
(Transcript at 69); 6) That Appellant charge^ the Partnership for 
tires for a motor vehicle which the Partnership did not own 
(Transcript at 70) ; 7) That Appellant paid managerial fees to his 
wife despite the Limited Partnership Agreement provision that 
Appellant was to be paid no salary (Transcript at 71-72); 8) That 
Appellant paid his own real estate license fee of $40.00 with 
Partnership funds (Transcript at 73 and 120); 9) That Appellant 
performed services outside the Partnership Agreement, that is, he 
did not exclusively work for the Partnership (Transcript at 75 and 
76) ; 10) That Appellant only gave Respondent tx 4% interest in the 
partnership for Respondent's initial contribution (Transcript at 
80) ; 11) That Appellant never gave Respondent the additional 
percentage in the Partnership to which Respondent felt he was 
entitled by paying off the loan to First Security Bank (Transcript 
at 82) ; 12) That Appellant valued his own interest in the 
Partnership at $556,000,00 on the books of the Partnership rather 
than $100,000.00 when the Partnership Agreement states that his 
contribution is at least $100,000.00 (Transcript at 83); and 13) 
That Appellant encumbered the partnership property with a note to 
the Limited Partner without first obtaining the Limited Partner's 
written approval (Transcript at 135). 
With regard to the allegations of improper conduct, Appellant 
will examine each allegation and demonstrate that, in each 
instance, the evidence presented at trial does not support the Trial 
Court's finding that Appellant willfully breached the Partnership 
Agreement or engaged in any conduct that would justify a d€*cree 
dissolving the Partnership. 
Utah Code Annotated §48-1-29 sets forth the grounds on which a 
court should decree dissolution of a partnership. The only grounds 
relevant to the findings of the Trial Court in this case would be 
those set cut in subsections "d." This provides that the court 
shall decree a dissolution whenever: 
d) A partner willfully or persistently commits a breach of the 
partnership agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in 
matters relating to the partnership business that it is not 
reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership 
with him. 
The only finding by the Trial Court that is relevant to 
determining whether the Partnership should have been dissolved is 
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found at paragraph 4 of the Court's Findings olf Fact: 
"The Defendant, Ilurlan D. Carter, hais conducted the 
business of the Partnership and kept the pooks and records 
of the Partnership in a fashion that isl in violation of 
the Partnership Agreement and has willfully breached the 
Partnership Agreement by retaining certain funds of the 
Partnership and applying them to his own use as well as 
expending Partnership resources in matters not furthering 
the Partnership interests" (Record at 284) . 
However, that finding is not supported by the evidence presented at 
trial. 
Appellant has been unable to discover any cases specifically 
interpreting the term "willful breach." Howevler, in the context of 
desertion as a ground for divorce, willful hafe been defined as "on 
purpose, intentional" Kidman v. Kidman 164 P. 2d 201 at 202 (Utah 
1945) and, in the Criminal Code, willful is defined as "[having a] 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the 
result." U.C.A. §76-2-103(1). Accordingly, in this case, in order 
for Appellant to have been found to have willfully breached the 
Partnership Agreement there must be evidence that he had the 
conscious objective or desire to breach the Agreement or at least 
the conscious objective or desire to engage in conduct which would 
be a breach of the Partnership Agreement. 
Despite Respondent's contention at trial that Appellant had 
acted improperly by not preparing a deed or otiher coveyance to the 
Partnership of the real estate which was his capital contribution, 
the Limited Partnership Agreement did not require that Appellant 
prepare or execute any document of conveyance. The Limited 
Partnership Agreement provides only that f,GE|NERAL PARTNER shall 
contribute to the PARTNERSHIP his equity under an uniecorded uniform 
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real estate contract.,." (Trial Exhibit D-l). Furthermore, 
Respondent never asked the Appellant to deed the property 
(Transcript at 94) and, at least until the obligation to First 
Security Bank was paid off the Appellant was unable to convey title 
to the property. Appellant's having retained record ownership of 
the property could hardly be considered a willful breach of the 
Agreement under these circumstances. 
The Limited Partnership Agreement contains no provision 
requiring the general partner to provide tax returns for the limited 
partner. However, even if the Court were to infer that there was a 
requirement that Appellant provide tax information or tax returns, 
it is important to note, again, that Respondent never requested tax 
returns (Transcript at 98-99) . When the tax return information was 
offered in 1983,. Respondent said he didn't n£ed the information 
(Transcript at 155 and 157). At any rate, the tax* returns were 
prepared in 1985 and delivered to Respondent (Transcript at 121) . 
Clearly, the failure to provide a partnership tax return to 
Respondent until 1985 for the years 1982, 1983 or 1984 was net a 
willful breach of the Limited Partnership Agreement. 
With regard to Appellant's duties relating to maintaining 
records of the Partnership, Section 12 of the Agreement provides: 
There shall be maintained during the continuance of this 
PARTNERSHIP an accurate set of bocks of accounts of all 
transactions, assets, and liabilities of the PARTNERSHIP. The* 
books shall be balanced and closed at the end of each year, and 
any other time on reasonable request of the GENERAL PARTNER. 
The books are to be kept at the principle place of business of 
the PARTNERSHIP and are to be opened for inspection by any 
partner at all reasonable times. The profits and losses of the 
PARTNERSHIP and its books of accounts shall be maintained on an 
annual fiscal basis, terminating annually on the 31st day of 
December, unless otherwise determined by the GENERAL PARTNER. 
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Appellant's alleged failure to provide the books and records to 
Respondent for review until January of 1985 ils clearly not a breach 
of the Limited Partnership Agreement. There was no testimony that 
the Appellant refused to make them available to the Respondent 
until 1985 and the only testimony presented ih that regard was that 
the Respondent failed to request an opportunity to review the books 
and records of the partnership until January of 1985 (Transcript at 
67, 99 and 157) . 
Respondent suggested that because the Appellant kept no 
checking account for the Partnership he had violated the Partnership 
Agreement. However, the unrefuted testimony at trial was that 
Appellant did keep a checking account (Transcript at 117) although 
the balance of the account was only enough to cover checks written 
on the account and did not include all of the income of the 
partnership (Transcript at 120). The manner in which Appellant 
maintained the Partnership checking account cannot be determined a 
willful breach of the Partnership Agreement. 
Respondent suggested at trial that Appellants refusal to let 
Respondent look at the checking account and other records of the 
partnership for over a week after a request in January of 1985 was a 
willful breach of the agreement. However, Respondent was granted an 
opportunity to review those documents after request. A delay of one 
week certainly does not constitute a refusal to grant access to the 
books and records of the limited partnership such as to constitute a 
willful breach of the Limited Partnership Agreement, especially in 
light of Respondent's failure to show any interest in the bocks or 
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records of the Partnership for two and one half years (Transcript at 
99) . 
There are three instances on which evidence was presented from 
which Respondent argued and the Court apparently found that there 
was a use by Appellant of partnership funds for unauthorized 
expenditures. Those included Appellant's purchase of tires for a 
motor vehicle with partnership assets, the payment of managerial 
fees to his wife and the purchase of his real estate license. 
Appellant clearly purchased tires for a motor vehicle and the 
evidence at trial was undisputed that the Partnership owned no motor 
vehicle. However, evidence at trial that was presented with 
reference to the ownership of the motor vehicle indicated that the 
tires "might have" been installed on a vehicle which Appellant used 
in the operation of the business, that is, a tractor. The tractor 
was used for other things as well (Transcript at 115-116). However, 
the tractor was clearly used for partnership purposes (Transcript at 
116) . The purchase of tires for a vehicle which was used for 
partnership purposes, whether exclusively or not, could hardly be 
found a willful breach of the Limited Partnership Agreement without 
more evidence to indicate the extent of use of the vehicle for 
purposes other than to further the partnership interest. This is 
especially so if one accepts Respondent's position that Appellant 
was to exert all of his efforts exclusively in the Partnership 
business. The only evidence presented at trial with reference to 
use of the tractor for other than Partnership interest was testimony 
that the Appellant used the tractor for some backhoe work for 
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Respondent on a job not connected with the partnership activities 
for which Appellant was paid $100.00 (Transcript at 116), The use 
of the tractor for that purpose over a five year period of time 
where, according to testimony/ the tractor was used for partnership 
purposes other than on that instance, could hardly be determined a 
willful breach of the Partnership Agreement. 
The Partnership Agreement provided that Appellant should 
receive no salary for services provided as a general partner (Trial 
Exhibit D-l at Section 8). Appellant's payment of managerial fees 
to his wife for services rendered to the partnership is not a 
willful breach of the Partnership Agreement because: 1) There was 
no provision in the contract prohibiting Appellant from hiring a 
manager and certainly no provision in the contract or the law that 
would prohibit the Appellant from hiring his wife as the manager; 
and 2) The testimony presented at trial concerning the meaning of 
the provision prohibiting the Appellant from paying himself a salary 
indicated that the prohibition against payment of a salary meant 
that no compensation should be paid to him for doing work required 
as a contractor (Transcript at 127). Any other interpretation of 
the contract would be clearly absurd in light of the circumstances 
of the parties. 
Based on the testimony at trial, it is only reasonable to 
assume that Appellant continue to operate the mobile home park in 
the same manner as he had prior to entering into the Partnership 
Agreement. He and his family had expended efforts in the management 
of the mobile home park. The Appellant's signing of the Partnership 
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Agreement did not effect other family members' obligations or rights 
with reference to their employment. Any other ruling would hold 
that a husband, by signing a contract to not compete or to provide 
services thereby obligated other family membersf including his wife, 
to the same contractual agreement. That would clearly not be 
appropriate and a direct infringement on Constitutional and 
Statutory provisions which guaranty equal rights to women, whether 
married or not. (See U.C.A. § 78-11-1; Article IV Section 1 and 
Article XXII Section 2 of the Utah State Constitution.) Of course, 
Appellant received some benefit by reason of paying his wife a 
managerial fee since, according to the testimony and evidence at 
trial, that was the only income generated by the family except 
$100.00 earned by Appellant on a backhow job for Respondent. 
Had Appellant's wife had some*other job and had Appellant hired 
an individual to provide the same services provided by his wife, 
something clearly not prohibited by the Partnership Agreement, the 
result would have been exactly the same as retaining his wife to 
work in that capacity. To ensure continuity and effective 
management the Appellant continued to do what he had done in the 
past, that is, paid his wife to manage and take care of the 
Partnership properties. 
While it is true that the Appellant paid his real estate 
license fee of $40.00 with Partnership assets, it is also true that 
the real estate license was available for use on behalf of the 
Partnership (Transcript at 157-158). In light of Appellants 
activities as a real estate agent, his payment of the real estate 
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license out of Partnership assets would be in furtherance of the 
interest of the Partnership, not a willful breach of the Partnership 
Agreement. 
It seems incredible that Respondent would argue on the one hand 
that Appellant's family could not be employed on behalf of the 
Partnership to manage the Partnership assets and at the same time 
maintain that Appellant was obligated to exclusively expend all of 
his efforts on behalf of Partnership activities. In essence, 
Respondent would have this Court believe that Appellant agreed to 
submit himself to uncompensated servitude during the term of the 
Partnership's existence. When interpreting the provisions of the 
contract the Court should certainly consider the contract in light 
of reasonable human experience. In this instance, the Appellant 
admittedly did some part time excavation work for Respondent that 
was not in direct furtherance of Partnership activities (Transcript 
at 75 and 76). However, Appellant's performance of those services 
could hardly be determined a willful breach of the Partnership 
Agreement since the services were provided at Respondent's request. 
At the very least Respondent should be deemed to have waived any 
claim for breach by reason of Appellant's conduct on that instance. 
Admittedly, Appellant worked as a real estate agent during 1985 
with Go Realty (Transcript at 26). However, his activities as a 
real estate agent, while not exclusively fdr the Partnership 
interest, would clearly be in furtherance of the Partnership's 
-28-
interests (Transcript at 157-158) at least in significant part, 
since the business of the Partnership was to develop and sell lots 
in the mobile home park. 
Respondent argued at trial that Appellants failure to properly 
credit Respondents percentage interest in the partnership amounted 
to a breach of the Partnership Agreement. However, there was 
clearly a dispute between the parties with reference to the 
interpretation of the contract. As set forth above, the 
interpretation of that contract should be resolved in favor of 
Appellant. However, whatever the Court's ruling with reference to 
interpretation of the Agreement, it is apparent that Appellant's 
position with regard to that issue was not a willful breach of the 
partnership agreement. And, at any rate, the Appellant's assignment 
of an incorrect percentage interest to Respondent would have little, 
if any, effect on the operation of the Partnership and therefore 
hardly be any kind of material breach of the Partnership agreement 
such as would affect any of the rights or obligations of the parties 
as between themselves until the time came for the exercise of 
Appellant's reacquisition rights. Since there was no effort made to 
reacquire the alleged breach never became ripe for resolution. 
Respondent also argued at trial that the Appellant's valuation 
of his interest in the Partnership assets of $556,000.00 constituted 
a breach of the Partnership Agreement. However, the Agreement-
provides only that Appellant's interest in the Partnership property 
is at least $100,000.00. There is no indication in the Partnership 
Agreement that Appellant's interest in the Partnership assets is not 
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$556,000.00 as alleged by Appellant at trial ind as represented to 
Respondent prior to execution of the partnership agreement. 
Appellant1s assessment of the value of his interest in the 
Partnership assets is clearly not a willful breach of the 
Partnership agreement or any obligations pursuant to that 
Partnership agreement. 
Finally, the Appellant appeared to tak0 the position that 
Respondent's execution of a Trust Deed in favot of the Respondent, 
in order to protect Respondent's interest in the Partnership assets, 
violated the Partnership agreement since execution of the Trust Deed 
to Respondent encumbered Partnership property without written 
permission by the Limited Partner. That position is absurd. The 
Limited Partner's acceptance of the signed Trust Deed and Trust Deed 
Note would clearly amount to a waiver or estoppel concerning any 
allegation that the encumbrance constituted a breach of the Limited 
Partnership Agreement. There was no evidence presented that 
Appellant encumbered the property in favor of ahyone other than the 
Limited Partner. There was no need that Appellant obtain the 
Limited Partner's written permission to give the only Limited 
Partner a security interest in the Partnership assets. 
Even when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to 
the Trial Court's factual determination, there is insufficient 
evidence to support a finding by the Trial Court that there was any 
willful breach of the Limited Partnership Agreement by Appellant 
such as would be necessary to sustain an Order of Dissolution 
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pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §48-1-29 (1953). 
?. It is not Necessary for the Existence of a Limited 
Partnership that the General Partner have an Ownership Interest in 
the Assets of the Partnership, 
Apparently as an alternative to determining that dissolution 
should be granted pursuant to a finding of willful breach, the Trial 
Court determined that, since the Respondent owned 125% of the 
partnership assets, pursuant to the court's interpretation of the 
limited partnership agreement, there was no longer a partnership. 
That position is clearly in conflict with the law of limited 
partnerships. 
This is not a general partnership, nor a real property dispute 
nor a situation where one person has become a sole owner, nor a 
situation where a lender has conducted a sheriff's sale. This case 
involves a limited partnership. When considered under the 
applicable limited partnership law, the Judgment dissolving the 
Partnership because Respondent owns 125% of the Partnership assets 
cannot stand. 
Nothing is clearer in limited partnership law than that a 
demarcation line divides the general partner from the limited 
partner. The limited partner makes contributions to the 
partnership, and is entitled to a share of profits. The limited 
partner is protected from liability in excess of the amount of his 
investment, which is the paramount concern of limited partners and 
the reason they invest as limited partners rather than general 
partners. In return for this limited liability, limited partners 
-31-
have no say in the management or control of th£ partnership. U.C.A. 
§48-2-7. The general partner, on the othei) hand, has unlimited 
liability, together with absolute control and management of the 
partnership, so that he can determine the extent of liabilities he 
is willing to incur. 
The Uniform Limited Partnership Act (U.C.A. §48-2-1 et seq.) is 
founded on the theory that an investor should be able to put his 
money in a limited partnership and depend on others for management 
of the business, without the investor incurring additional liability 
in the process. Wertheimer, "Substantive Law and Special Problems 
of General and Limited Partnerships," AL1-ABA[ Resource Materials; 
Partnerships, 3rd Ed., at 80 (1982). 
The major error in the Judgment stems from the premise that if 
a limited partner were to contribute additional assets to the 
partnership (under an cigreement providing for acquisition of 
additional partnership units for such contributions) , then the 
limited partner could become sole owner and therefore destroy the 
partnership and the interest of the general partner. This is false. 
A limited partner may acquire additional limited partnership 
interests, entitling him to an additional share of profits (even all 
of the profits for a period of time) and/or a certain dollar amount; 
yet none of those obligations would interferle with the general 
partner's interest in the partnership, since a general partnership 
interest is separate and distinct from a limited partnership 
interest. 
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Utah Code Annotated §48-2-2(1)(a) requires that the amount of 
contributions of a limited partner be stated in the limited 
partnership certificate, and §48-2-4 states certain requirements 
regarding the character of a limited partner's contribution. 
Nothing is stated in the statute with respect to a general partner's 
contribution, for one very good reason: A general partner is not 
required to make any contribution of cash or property to a limited 
partnership; 
All statutes provide that the limited partners must make a 
contribution to the capital of the business. None of 
them, however, require a general partner to make any 
contribution. Cavitch, 2 Business Organizations, 39-44 to 
39-45 (1979). (Noting also that a limited partner's 
contribution to the firm is not a loan. See Copp v. 
Chestnutt, 196 N.l.S. 2d. 752 (I960)). 
Indeed, in many limited partnerships, the total amount of funds and 
assets contributed to a partnership will come from the limited 
partners. The general partner can be compensated for recognizing 
the business opportunity and obtaining investors ("putting the deal 
together"), and need do nothing more than provide certain services 
to the partnership as partnership manager. Of course, the genercLl 
partner can make cash or property contributions as a general partner 
or limited partner if he wishes. Nevertheless, the general partner 
need make no contribution to a limited partnership, nor be entitled 
to a share of current profits. 
It is fundamentally unsound to believe that additional 
contributions by a limited partner will eliminate the interest of 
the general partner, since the general partner need have no 
contribution to begin with. Indeed, the limited partnership 
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agreement in this case anticipates that Crowther will be repaid his 
approximately $122,000 contribution. This is consistent with common 
limited partnership provisions, whereby a limited partner may be 
entitled to a large share or even 100% oif the profits of the 
operation for a certain period of time untlil he has obtained a 
complete return of capital, and thereafter a larger share of profits 
would be allocated to the general partner. This is common and 
customary and to be expected in a limited partnership. 
There is no possible way, on the other hand, to construe a 
situation under limited partnership law whereby additional 
contributions from a limited partner would eliminate the interest of 
the general partner and require dissolution olf the partnership and 
removal of the general partner from his position as manager, or 
require the vesting of assets in the name of a limited partner. The 
additional contributions of a limited partner entitle him to a 
larger limited partner's interest: an increased share of profits 
and an increased amount due him as return of capital; but additional 
contributions do not and cannot buy out the interest of the general 
partner. The general partner's interest cannpt be bought out in 
that manner. 
Indeed, the Conclusions of Law in this case would place the 
parties in the anomalous position of the Gqneral Partner being 
excluded from the Partnership and the Partnership being dissolved, 
with the understanding that if the former General Partner were to 
make a partial repayment to the former Limited Partner so as to 
bring the former Limited Partner's ownership in the "partnership" 
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back below the supposed 100% ownership figure, then the Partnership 
would somehow be re-created with the former General Partner as the 
new General Partner. Adhering to limited partnership law, on the 
other hand, will permit the General Partner to remain as general 
partner, and avoid such a contradictory result. 
Also, it should be recognized that if a limited partner were to 
participate in management or exercise control in partnership 
matters, he would lose his limited liability. It is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the dichotomy between general partners and limited 
partners to believe that a limited partner can have such control 
(through the making of additional contributions) over a limited 
partnership as to be able to destroy its very existence, or to be 
able to convert the limited partner to a general partner. If the 
limited partner did such a thing, he would immediately incur the 
liability of a general partner, which is the one thing the limited 
partnership is designed to protect against. This is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the entire rationale of limited partnership law. 
C. INTEREST ON APPELLANT'S REACQUISITION COST SHOULD BE SET AT 
1.5 PERCENT ABOVE THE NEW YORK PRIME LENDING RATE, NOT THE PRIME 
LENDING RATE OF STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH. 
There was no evidence presented at trial from which the 
court could determine the interest that should be applied to the 
reacquisition costs and certainly no evidence that the interest rate 
should be 1.5% over the State Bank of Southern Utah prime lending 
rate. The court concluded that in the absence of any factual basis 
for that determination. The Trial Court's ruling in that regard 
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Court's eventual determination that the Agreement was unambiguous, 
the receipt of that evidence may not have made a difference. 
However, in light of the ambiguous nature of the Agreement and the 
Trial Court's receipt and consideration of other extrinsic evidence 
of intent, Appellant should have been afforded the opportunity to 
fully present his theory of the case. 
CONCLUSION 
In this instance the trial court's interpretation of the 
contract cannot stand in light of the appropriate standard of 
review, the economic realities of the parties' relationship and the 
parties' subsequent conduct. This court should determine that, in 
light of the record at trial, the Respondent's payment of the 
$92,717.27 obligation to First Security Bank was a fulfillment of 
the obligation under the initial contribution section of the 
contract and reduce Respondent's percentage interest in the 
Partnership assets accordingly. 
The Trial Court should not have awarded a Decree of 
Dissolution. The Decree of Dissolution in this case could only be 
supported by a finding that the Appellant had willfully breached the 
partnership agreement. That finding cannot stand in light of the 
evidence presented at trial. There is no other basis on which a 
finding of dissolution can be supported based on the Record and the 
Trial Court's Findings. 
Clearly, a limited partnership continues to exist although the 
limited partner owns all of the assets of the partnership. This 
Limited Partnership should have been allowed to continue to exist so 
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a6 \'ti Cu^.:i-* * *•• y .ir+r.pr-! . ^ •. «= t e r m i n a t e d p u r s u a n t t.c 
i t s f n r i n - , - . , . iciy o . J : < - ep t i o n . 
i-'irir: __ -lie ii t.* :«•:-* rate < f M>- reacqui' it inn 'nf-it hi.aid be 
1.5% over the New York prime r * > «• , i he State Bank of Southern 
Utah 
;
 JIC- *-'. en? :"1 , oi;: ^  determines that . : : u . m 
this appeal phnu!^ *• * - . : ,t ^ ^ ,avo: ' -: :-t-1 L;:.t , 
Appel • , i i>. • M- ritiv^  t h s case remanded 
:ut,;,...t ;^dii ;.;• presented from,. Appel 3 ai * ' ,; <: jt^uiig 
*• he reasonable-"00"- -^ J • i :. . » i.» conr.jct advocated 
I 1 - ?-•- ; » •'"*'
 t .. ,. *,. - deniet; i oppor+unir\ pre'*- * 
evidence ,v "r.ai and ,rder .^o have a - ^^t.(,,:t 
shoulc. be given * r-1 •• 
T • • . .... r. ,ui t ohc\- • d i »_ reversed 
Ordc i .. JissoiL'-]( r se" aside s^  ---a* ti- "•••-**: -.-• ^  .... ^ ..L;:.^^, 
Appellant s*~r-i * r~ * • • •* - jei^idi Pawner or the limited 
Pari:- -* L'_.^  the Limited Pa:-: *-rshi: / ~ . •"". 
Respondent's mfciest • ].* rartrer:;]: .tterm.iHr^ ; , 
^rrludina paymen- *
 J O ^i. n itiai crntribution 
*"- "
 ; ' M.Lit.K.-u > ) *.0*i et~ rh" * nr ;:nt r 3]" . ' . - -*s 
ihtere^1 rate v Appellant r ~v . . n-e 
!
*3% over the \ cw York i * *• * - otatt Bank t Southern 
Ltah rr-^i 
DATED tnit rfoc dav of (jzJ&ke/^ * 19fi", 
. T Q . 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Appellant's Brief, U.S. postage prepaid, this 
day of October, 1987 to: 
JAMES L. SHUMATE 
110 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 623 
Cedar City, Utah 84720-0623 
~1Q-
ADDkNDt'M 
Hf'Vih Ccdo, Ann. § 4 8 - 2 - 2 . 
I 1| ) Two or more persons des. • : •- nci—ip 
shall: 
M U c.i.c swear to a certificate .-n ^ naJ . -tat-; 
1st The name of the partnership. 
2nd The character of the business. 
3rd The location of the principal place of business. 
4th The name and place of residence of each member; 
general and limited partners being separately designated. 
5th The term icr which the partnership is to e;:i?\. 
6th The amount or cash and a description of and the 
agreed value of the ether property contributed by each limited 
partner, 
tii 7 he additional . o;:u^u,,uuo, L L cu:\ , agreed t^ oe 
made by each limited partner and the times at which, er evert-
on the happening of which, they shall be made. 
8th The time, if agreed upon, wl.e; * ..-. .ii::;x>-ati.i 
of each limited partner is to be returned* 
9th The share of the proiits, e: the other 
compensation by way of income, which ea-^ t • r.iteci parvr.t ; • • * "! 
receive Ly reason of his contribution. 
10th The right, if given, of a limited partner to 
substitute an assignee as contributor in hit- place, arc the 
terms and conditions of the substitution, 
11th The right, if given. ;f the partners u admit 
additional limited par^nei i:. 
*•* "lie right/ if given, ,;: ont cr more „i the 
luiiiLeu jjaiiners to priority over other Jinited partners as to 
contributions, or as to compensation bv -* c ii.^ '4m*- : : d ; ne 
nature of such priority. 
13th The right, if given, of the remaining general 
partner or partners to continue the business on the death, 
retirement: ..*.r insanity of a general partner, and 
'; 4th The right, if given, of a limited partner tc 
demand and receive rrore--' * er -»-H=an ^ o ^ . ..
 re--i IT: :er 'ii'c 
coi itributicr . 
(b) File .ei . . the certificate: in the office c: tne 
county clerk of tht ity in which the principal place of 
business of the partnership shall be situated, and in case si h 
partnership shall have a place of business n- more than •  v-e 
county then a copy of such certificate certified by the countv 
clerk of the county where the original was filed shall be filed 
for record in the office of the county clerk in e^ch county in. 
which such partnership shall have a place oi business, 
i\ limited partnership is formed if there at reen 
^tstaiitia. ccnMance in good faith wi'1" * ;>- requirements of 
paragraph *!> . 
CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AND 1 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
Agreement of Limited Partnership made this 
day of JulU , 1982., between MURIAN D. j 
CARTER of 170(J North Main Street, Cedar City, Iron County, ! 
Utah, herein referred to as GENERAL PARTNER; and COMPUTER 
SERVICE OF SOUTHERN UTAH PENSION TRUST, STEVEN D. CROWTHER, 
Trustee, of 26 North Main Street, Cedar City, Iron County, I 
Utah, herein referred to as LIMITED PARTNER. | 
RECITALS 
1. The GENERAL and LIMITED PARTNER desire to enter into I 
the business of owning, buying, selling, developing, improving, j 
and otherwise dealing with real property and performing all 
other legally permissible functions related or incidental I 
thereto. j 
2. GENERAL PARTNER desires to manage and operate the i 
business. 
3. LIMITED PARTNER desires to invest in the business I 
i 
t 
and to limit his liability. ! 
In consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein, | 
the parties agree as follows: i 
1. GENERAL PROVISIONS. The LIMITED PARTNERSHIP is organized 
pursuant to the provisions of 48-2-1 eL. sag., Utah Code Annotated 
— I 
1953, as amended, and the rights and Inabilities of the GENERAL j 
and LIMITED PARTNER shall be as provided therein, except as 
otherwise herein expressly stated. 
2. NAME OF THE PARTNERSHIP. The name of the partnership 
shall be C & C Development, hereinafter referred to as the 
PARTNERSHIP. 
3. BUSINESS OF THE PARTNERSHIP. The purpose of the 
PARTNERSHIP is to engage in the business of owning, buying, 
selling, developing, improving, and otherwise dealing with 
real property and performing all other legally permissible 
functions related or incidental thereto. Said PARTNERSHIP 
is to have and to exercise all the powers now or hereafter 
conferred by the laws of the State of Utah on partnerships 
organized pursuant to the laws of that State and any and all 
acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto. The above 
enumerated purposes shall not be construed as limiting or 
restricting in any manner the purposes in which this PARTNERSHIP 
may engage, and the PARTNERSHIP shall always have the power 
to engage in any purpose incidental, to the specific purposes 
de s ignated above. 
.- principle place of business of the- PARTNERSHIP 
-..•a *. ot ai 1700 North Main Street, Ceda.- City, iron Councy, 
•••u: PARTNERSHIP shall also have other places of busirie:-
.*., :.-.-i t:,r;,; to time shall be determined "by GENERAL PARTNER. 
5 . CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION OF GENERAL PARTNER. GENERAL 
PARTNER shall contribute to the PARTNERSHIP his equity under-
.in 'unrecorded uniform real estate contract in that 1 and referr 
lo and described specifically as follows: 
.•".'.inning at a point 492.79 feet: North, 1317.87 feet 
.est and South 89°41,lln West 670.0 feet from the Southeast 
•orner of Section 35, Township 35 South, Range 11 West, 
" " " -ike Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
." East 478.24 feet; thence North 89026*54M West 
7../.y? feet; thence North 0°C1!40" East 145.01 feet; 
thence North 88°09f29n West 166.74 feet; thence North 
11052'14" East 35.0 feet; thence South 89°32,16" West 
. 142.91 feet j thence North 13°20'24" East 331,93 feet; 
'• thence East 1189.5 feet; thence South 0' 15'50" East 
86.28 feet to the point of beginning, excepting therefrom, | 
those areas designated as lots 10, II, and 22 of the j 
Plat of the Mobile Home Estates, a planned unit development,; 
prepared by Eckhoff, Watson and Preator, and submitted i 
for preliminary approval to the Cedar City Planning | 
Commission. I 
i 
The PARTNERS agree L.K.L c.;e aolia. •„ ^ ., .he GENERA.. j 
PARTNERS contribution shall be at xeast ONE HUNDRED 7/D: 5/«L»0 ;;0I1ARS; 
($100,000) and that ^.JLJ ., ntrib^cion s,ia^  oe ,tlnc upor. tne ) 
execution of these articles. GENERAL PARTNER may ai bo make 
other contributions to the PARTNERSHIP as set forth hereinbeloi 
or as agreed from time to time by the GENERAL and LIMITED 
PARTNER. 
6, CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE LIMITED PARTNER. The 
LIMITED PARTNER hereby ^rees t^ make in:J:i^ l ^.,->-'• ~r -• , u , 
to the PARTNERSHIP ^ fv.^/o: [ 
„ ( ,. p ^  y i f f .i c e r t d i /. 2nd 1 . ^ u : - o e.. , e ^  e r. c 1 v ! 
f 
of r e c o r d a g a n . M c e r t a i n p rop , - : y I JCO.: eci . * V^  ' ' - ^ 'Cest 
400 N o r t h , C e t a i C^uy, I r o n i * " r . ^ - r c y i-ein^ 
a six (6) plex apartment building owned Dy the LIMITED PARTNER. 
The 2nd Trust Deed evidences a debt of approximately SEVENTEEN ' 
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($17,000.00) owed by the GENERAL PARSER ' 
to the Stratton Brothers Cattle Company as a result of a previous! 
j 
law suit. i 
B. To use his_be_st efforts to substitute himself i 
in place of the Country Aire_Estates, a California Limited 
Partnership, on a 1st Trust Deed Note between Country Aire J 
Estates and First Security Bank in Cedar City, Iron County, 
Utah, which 1st Trust Deed Note covers tne real property described 
under paragraph 5 above. 
C. To use his best reasonable efforts to obtain | 
a Letter of Credit or other bond or security as required by j 
Cedar City Corporation to allow the development of the above-
described property as a planned unit development in accordance < 
with plans already preliminarily approved by Cedar City Corporation 
I 
and to pay whatever expenses are attendent upon said bond, J 
Letter of Credit, of other security. j 
LIMITED PARTNER also agrees to contribute additional I 
c^ash or property as capital for the use of the PARTNERSHIP 
for the following purposes, should the GENERAL PARTNER request 
said contribution: j 
A. Payment of the amount due on snunrecorded Real 
Estate Contract with a present balance of approximately NINETY I 
FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($95,500.00) wnich Com.rac: covers j 
the sale of the real property described in paragraph 5 hereof j 
from Country Aire Estates, a California Limited Partnership,
 ( 
to MURIAN D. CARTER, the GENERAL PARTNER herein, which Contract 
bears payments of TWELVE HUNDRED AND NINE DOLLARS AND THIRrY j 
EIGHT CENTS ($1,209.38) per month with the entire balance 
due in 1983. The payment of this Contract obligation will j 
discharge any purchase money obligation owing against the j 
property described in paragraph 5 hereinabove by paying off | 
the unrecorded Real Estate Contract and the 1st Trust Deed i 
I 
Note described in paragraph 6 (B) above. j 
! 
I 
I 
R
 ^proximately SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($7,000.00) j 
ack taxeo ^^^ *Ar*d payable to the County of Iron, State of I 
i 
"^proximately FIFTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS .i *.ti , u,L/, )0j i 
V.^—r-d 1 , Eekhofi, W t s o n , and Preator, Engineers o„ ucu,.; ] 
.'"ur,, A r w> * A allegedly done on the above-ascribed I 
.*! property ai.u :^r which a Mechanic's Lien has been filed 
-, A^v s.It 1 o *u progress to foreclose the Lien and collec 
e amount, due. 
1 . vproxiKutely FIVE THOUSAND '.>.,, 0«0 . C-J) for 
*-• -«r d. --><'*\ I nprovement District for sewer work 
in relation co the above-referenced property, 
E, Such other and further expenses as may arise 
during the development of the project. 
It is the intention of the GENERAL PARTNER and the LIMITED 
PARTNER to this Agreement, that in return for LIMITED PARTNER"• 
initial Investment of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($17,000.00) 
and his attempts to Substitute himse TfTin-pl ace,, of Country; 
Ai.re. E.sta..tes..J a California Limited Partnership, on a 1st 
Trust Deed Note with First Security Bank, and (his best ei:i:o:i 
tq_ provide jaJLatter of Credit ur other bond or scc^i.y w^ 
^inance the developments to the abovej^dascjrjLbajd.x £a 1 ..propc. , -
the LIMITED PARTNER shall have and hereby Is given a twenty 
percent (20%)I ownership interest in the real property and 
project described above, ^Further, iu ("lie event th^t LIAiTLu 
PARTNER is required to contribute any more cash to the develop- j 
ment of the p r ^_ c-c t, L I *•'* 171. ?ARTNER sha 11 raceive one (Xli '"'I • 
j 
additional perteuLa^e ..o*.!,*, of jwuero... ) Interest for each j 
i 
ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS " r of ddoitional cash which !• 
I 
he contributes ^ : he . --*^ i :.uc:iu;.s of ONE Th"0USAND | 
DOLLAR ($1,000,00) contributions will buy LIMITED PARTNER j 
an equal fraction •: o.mership. ! 
r 
It is further a^r^ed between the parties hereto that i; 
GENERAL PARTNER can reduce or eliminate LIMITED PARTNER*.., j: 
ownership Interest in the above-described real estate and ! 
j . 
project by paying to the LIMITED PARTNER, any time within j' 
five (5) years of the particular contribution by LIMITED ; 
PARTNER, all or part of the LIMITED PARTNER'S total contribution 
to this project, plus interest on that contribution, which 
interest is to be calculated quarterly at one and one half 
percent (1%Z) dbove the prime interest rate. in the event 
that GENERAL PARTNER pays off the entire contribution plus 
interest as calculated above, then LIMITED PARTNER shall be 
eliminated from this project and shall have no further claim 
upon the project.* In the event that GENERAL PARTNER pays 
only a portion of LIMITED PARTNER'S investment, then LIMITED 
PARTNER'S interest shall be reduced one percent (^ %) for every 
ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00) of LIMITED PARTNER'S contribution 
repaid over and above LIMITED PARTNERS initial contribution ^ 
as set forth hereinabove in paragraph 6. Repayment of all 
or part of LIMITED PARTNER'S initial contribution shall be 
made in the same fashion as repayment of the LIMITED PARTNER'S 
additional contributions, that is ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00) 
plus interest repaid to LIMITED PARTNER will reduce LIMITED 
PARTNER'S ownership interest by 1 percent (1%). 
In the event that GENERAL PARTNER sells any portion of 
the above-described real estate in any fashion whatsoever 
within five (5) years after any contribution uy the LIMITED 
PARTNER as set forth hereinabove, and the GENERAL PARTNER 
does not within ninety six (96) hours after receiving the 
cash in hand apply those entire profits from said sale to 
paying off the LIMITED PARTNER'S investment herein, or applies 
only a portion of said profits to paying off the LIMITED PARTNER1^ 
investment herein, thenthe amount of profits not so applied 
or any profits received///////////////////////////////////////// 
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.or Lhe five (1-
 f* ... v . / i^ J w^i^ -•* ^ *vi*.oU boUi. L» *^-*.^  .*. 
. RTNER and LIMITED P^iRTNER in tue b—o ,u:c^:,0cs „s the 
:rcentage of owr.e/sh. p i.. s^^E p.v^,v._ ..c-v. ^ / CL^E^*,., P^.ri _. 
~r.-. LIMITED PARTNER cL .* .me ,3 b^.ns ,.." •• ^ " . :R •' P^TL.. 
-iceives said profits as casn in nai*u, j 
The GENERAL PARTNER shall not: encumber the pro.JcrL; j 
described in paragraph 5 hereinabove without the prior written 
I 
consent of" the LIMITED PARTNER. The GENERAL PARTNER shall 
notify the LIMITED PARTNER in writing frv... , L, days before 
the sale of the ju"c;irT' / c scrubs. para0r^^n 5 hereinabove 
of his intention , <. ^ , , : - p*'^ - I ." . e «IMITZD PARTNER 
disagrees with iny te-r , .he i>a*.. ^ ; ..... . *. ne sale itself, 
he must within live i . A i after racdivi.i^ notice of the 
GENERAL PARTNER'S in; t. selh : -le <-.\:h t,e GENERAL PARTNER 
his o :.] ect: Ion a n wr^ .: , r^ * ; ,•- o
 4J >..if e/ent that j 
the GENERAL PAR'iRrh* <a. ,: .• LIMITS J P^wEEEEn cannot agree j 
on the arrangements L. . r.io s.i-e o, u.n/ po. :I-h of the real j 
property described in paraji aph 5 Eerel adt^ ve , ooth parties i 
hereby agree that the nspule shui^ be bahuiuLed to J. Philip i 
Eves, Attorney a. Lfiv. , .10 norln Main Str^c. Suite E,» Cedar | 
i 
City, Utah 8^ \ > ; . i u.^  uijitrutu;, <<: a *on ocner person j 
ah 1 Phi Li [J Eves sl.u*. orp L._. .,, -be evunc thctt J. Philip j 
Eves falls or refuse^ t,» .u- o^ ^rbltra,.or ^ co appoint j 
someone else t. J „ t *. the croaclt* ,1 J P^ETEEES shall, select ' 
j 
another person upon whom they can both agree to act In that | 
capacity. The decision of the arbitrator shall be binding j 
on both parties. . ; 
DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF PARTNERS. GENERAL PARTNER j 
. _
 f 
,., . u: 11 gently and exclusively apply himself in ana about j 
;/:e ousiness o:' the PARTNERSHIP to the utmost of his skill | 
-. ,.: for the accomplishment, of the PARTNERSHlPspurposes. j 
•I 
GENERAL PARTNER shall not engage directly or indirectly ' 
;.n ,A-.v business in competition with the business of the PARTNERSHIP 
( 
-.t v: • * :.- .:ur lag the term of this Partnership Agreement 
without obtaining the written approval of all other partners, 
No LIMITED PARTNER shall have any ri0nt to be ac. wi 
in the conduct of the PARTNERSHIP'S buoiness, nor have power 
to bind the PARTNERSHIP in any contract, agreu-iuent, promise, 
or undertaking. 
(D SALARY OF THE GENERAL PARTNER. CENE.-u^  PARTNER 
shall be entitled to^n^salary^Cor services rendered by him. 
9. LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTIONS OF PROFITS. GENERAL 
PARTNER shall have the right, except as hereinafter provided, 
to determine whether from cime to time PARTNERSHIP profits 
shall be distributed in cash or shall be left in the business, 
in which event the capital account of ail partners shall 
be increased. In no event shall GENERAL PARTNER distribute 
profits to himself without distributing to the LIMITED PARTNER 
until the LIMITED PARTNER has been completely eliminated^ 
from this PARTNERSHIP by repayment of his investment as set 
forth hereinabove. 
10. PROFITS AND LOSSES FOR LIMITED PARTNER. LIMITED 
PARTNER or PARTNERS shall be entitled to receive a share 
of annual profits not otherwise distributed under the provision 
of this Agreement equivalant to their share o. ownership 
in the PARTNERSHIP project as established in accordance with 
the terms of paragraph 6 hereinabove. 
LIMITED PARTNER shall bear a share of the lo^seb of 
the PARTNERSHIP in the same percentage as the percentage 
of ownership held by said LIMITED PARTNER under the provisions 
of paragraph 6 hereinabove; but said losses shall not exceed 
the total investment of the LIMITED PARTNER. 
11. PROFITS AND LOSSES FOR THE GENERAL PARTNER. After 
provisions have been made for the shares of profits of the 
LIMITED PARTNER, all remaining profits of the PARTNERSHIP 
shall be paid to the GENERAL PARTNER. After giving effect 
to the share of the losses chargeable against the capital 
contributions of the LIMITED PARTNER, the reamining PARTNERSHIP 
losses shall be born by the GENERAL PARTNER. 
12. BOOK OF ACCOUNT. There shall be maintained during 
the continuance of this PARTNERSHIP an accurate set of books 
of, accounts of all transactions, c..n^
 4 _,, „n> liabilities * 
of the PARTNERSHIP. The books slnM \ _- b^i^.eed ui,^ c^os^d 
..u: die end o: each year, and any oL.'.c: t.L..e .a jeaso:*ab-e 
request of the GENERAL PARTNER. The ^^ o*co c*re- :o bo Avi,K > 
dt the principle place o£ business of tne PARTNERSHIP end 
are to be opened for inspection uy otivv partner at ai* /oas^. .,^x 
times,. The profits and losses of ::he PARTNERSHIP an*, 1' ~ 
books of accounts shall be maintained on an «;;:. ..ii. fi.-jca. -i-a^ i. , 
terminal: Lag annually on the 31st ohr/ o: Deo 
otherwise determined by the GENERAL PARTNE.w | 
i 
13. SUBSTITUTION, ASSIGNMENTS, AND ADMISSIONS OF ADDITIONAL J 
PARTNERS, GENERAL PARTNER .s.iall not substitute a partner-
in his place, 01; sell or a&L-.gu al. or any pari of his interest 
in the PARTNERSHIP business without t-;,,^  ..n-ittron conser,: of 
i:he LIMITED PARTNER. 
Additional LIMITED PARTNERS may be admitted to this 
PARTNERSHIP on terms that may be agreed on in writing between J 
GENERAL and the new LIMITED PARTNER r>ro\ idea that said terms I 
• ! 
shall constitute an amendment, to ihio Partnership Agreement ' j 
i 
and shall be approved in w n " '-v - \e ^r^ady existing i 
•*•' i 
LIMITED PARTNERS. I 
i 
No LIMITED PARTNER :..... ..,.-,*.. o..o an assignee as a LIMITED : 
i 
PARTNER in his place; but .^-e ^r^on wr persons entitled -j 
oy rule or by Intestate laws as the case may be, shall succeed ! 
to ail the right,:! of LIMITED P.ARTNER «s a substituted LIMITED | 
PARTNER, • 
1 4 t TERMINATION OF INTEREST OF LIMITED PARTNER; RETURN j 
OF CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION, The interest or any LIMITED PARTNER ! 
i 
may be terminated by j 
i 
/wrmal dissolution and winding up of the PARTNERSHIP; 
i 
i 
for a.. - •- . :r • , n-d by law.. .; j 
/ecnc.i: of ail the GENERAL and LIMITED PARTNERS. I 
i 
epayment to LIMITED PARTNER or PARTNERS, or j 
Iiib i. > - . - of , contributions to the PARTNERSHIP and ; 
j 
i.n,terest under' the terms of paragraph o hereinabove. j 
i 
i 
15. TERM OF PARTNERSHIP AND DISSJLUIVUN. PARTNERouIP 
term commences on the date of L.IO execu^on of che&e articicb 
by the partners and shall ena on. 
1. The dissolution of tue P^RxN^RSal? oy operation i 
of law, or 
I 
2. Dissolution at any other Ume as provided by | 
I 
law. | 
3. Passage of twenty (20) years from date of execution
 f 
of this Agreement. ' 
16. DEATH OF THE GENERAL PARTNER. ^n the event of the J 
death of the GENERAL PARTNER, parties hereto agree that GENERAL j 
PARTNER'S Personal Representative shall be substituted for 
the GENERAL PARTNER to operate the PARTNERSHIP business. 
At the close of the GENERAL PARTNER'S estate, GENERAL PARTNER'S j 
substitute shall be, m order of preference) his Wxfe, DELILAH ' 
CARTER, or his oldest son, SCOTT L. CARTER. J 
Substitute GENERAL PARTNER shall have the options of. 
1. Continuing the PARTNERSHIP business uncer this Agreement, 
or I 
2. Dissolving and winding up the PARTNERSHIP business I 
t 
and paying back to LIMITED PARTNERS their entire investment, 
plus interest under the provisxons of paragraph G hereinabove. j 
17. AMENDMENTS. This Agreement, except with respect , 
of the invested rights of partners, may oe amended at any 
time by majority vote of the partners.
 ( 
18. BINDING EFFECT OF AGREEMENT. Tms Agreement shall | 
! 
be binding on the parties hereto and their respective heirs, | 
executors, administrators, successors, and assigns. j 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have executed this Agreement 
at Cedar City, Iron County, State of Utah, the day and. year 
first above written. 
MURLAN D CARTER 
General Partner 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of I n n 
^ 4 
Z7 
•COMPUTER SERVICE OF SOUTHERN UTAH j 
PENSION TRUST, STEVEN D. CROWTEER, i 
TRUSTEE j 
On t h i s • ; ; / / / . jilay uf .7/. v 
~T~ 
personally appeared before me MURIAN D, CARTEI" 
,1982, 
;acr 
»i the within and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged 
• me^s&fiaft itee li^jo&cut e d t h P (.. tm I V ,, 
/ f / N O T A R y \ ^ 
# §9 P U B L I C " ' 
it %l 
ft. ^ f a t Pat° 
••t^ 
d<Y PUBLIC if 
s"J d ' 
Res i d i n g a t fv-'lV i<.-.^  c .-u -. 
My Commiss ion E x p i r e s ; -/•>-.fr 
On t h i s < < • / 
7~ 
,, 1 9 3 2 , 
personally appeared before me STEVEN D. CROWTKER, Trustee 
of COMPUTER SERVICE OF SOUTHERN UTAH. PENSION TRUST, the signer 
of Che within and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
| / M Q T A H Y \ '% 
h d! *,? i 
NOTARY PUBLIC/ /^f. 
Y» V <?- nnf-:*'•-' /'» 
Residing at 
My Commissi 
fr 
:\.'W *.'-;; .. / .* 
Fir] 
GALLIAM & WESTFALL 
G. Michael Westfall 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ST. GEORGE, U1A. 
(801) 628-168? 
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3 FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF ifTAJT 
STEVEN D. CROWTHER, Trustee 
for COMPUTER SERVICE OF 
SOUTHERN UTAH PENSION TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MURLAN D. CARTER, 
Defendant. 
iNDINGS OF FACT AND 
:ONCLUSilONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 85-]fll 
above-entitled matter having come before rh" I'PM > >> 
Friday, "a; 24, 1985, and the Honorable Robert >• > 'viiis having heard 
,-;• ."rustee of • !• Computer ?pr"irf - * 
Pension "rust h^ ~ *••<•• -.ppeared t-.-.cer'• - : • .,..-... . .e-.-orc. 
Jame* '^raa- uerend^.r' . r. -.n Carter ha-"-: r : 
c - •. i. • , ^ i.;t. «..i . i- .. ounse', f.cott v '- -? - • 
sworn and qave '-.estimor ^  * . . ..•..-.easts and 
numpr^r ••-• -: ••
 u*.~ ^.cepted : • '. o crurt. v':: rriday, 
K- ' • uur: made oer^air- findings and pic A,-' 
M21/8 n^s/* 
decisions about the operation of this Partnership and ordered 
counsel for the Plaintiff, James L. Shumate to prepare Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law together with a Judgment. The Court 
furthered ordered counsel for the Plaintiff to sxibmit the Judgment 
to counsel for the Defendant in order to receive their approval as 
to the form of the Judgment and counsel could not agree. The matter 
was again heard by the Court for review of the Judgment on June 11, 
1985, and the Court ordered that a sixty (60) day period be 
established whereby the assets of the Partnership, which consisted 
almost entirely of a mobile home and recreational vehicle park 
facility, be sold. Counsel for the Plaintiff and counsel for the 
Defendant could not agree upon the Judgment and Order arising out of 
the June 11, 1985, hearing. The Defendant sought and obtained 
services of new counsel and Mr. Lyle Drake of the firm of Gallian, 
Drake & Westfall entered his appearance as counsel for the Defendant 
on September 19, 1985, together with his partner, G. Michael 
Westfall. The matter was further submitted to the Court on the 
Defendant's objections to Judgment and Motion to Review Judgment and 
was argued to the Court on Wednesday, January 22, 1986, and again on 
February 21, 1986, and finally on Friday, February 27, 1987. 
The Court has now had the full opportunity to consider the 
briefs and arguments of counsel, to review the Courts' notes in the 
matter and the evidence and testimony, and now makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 19, 1982, the Defendant, Murlan D. Carter and the 
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Plaintiff, Stev«-r. i .'r'*w+-h^ * -; t .-prvir~ ~f 
Southern • ' ,L<_ ,U _I. '. ^ v.^r+ificat t- of limited 
Ei-i.i^jr.i^ art, .united Partnership Agreement. 
i m : ^ ^ r ^ , - ^ •> -•- , recudtJ -*• "-1--
r^ai;p ,-«eh rowtN-r, -v v!,„~\ .
 f i^ y 
tn<_ aitoruey drattmg thr- agreement. . Philip Eves. 
; - De^pndan1 , MurJan D. Carter, han rcnaucted the business 
i-i i' di J general partner. 
" ~* It -*ndant# Murlan D. Carter, har condm * ^ ' ij L-u'riuebS 
/'^••"-hni M 1 1 i il • iiuiiki* dini records of the 
1 uohiOii Lhdt. is in violation uf the Partnership 
Agreement .- : i willfully brpachi d the P.-i i \- m-r sh j j AgieemenL L^ 
retaining -or*- — hiri.1' .1 I In I\i i t- iiersiiip and applying them to his 
as expending Partnership resources in matters in l 
furthering the Partnership interest 
'"''f: Plaintiff ^ i-^.^ requested a Judicial Decree 
i I M, hbL- I Li tion of the Partnership and winding up of the Partus 
affairs, 
* -\ rt Murlnn D, Carter, executed 
hin, - -:--^  t> , rxui/.y . .! . •-.- "ompany of Southern Utah, n r iv-'< ' m 
Trustee, i oerta.* :.v.re securer * J l| » i, » , , Uie amcunt - ! 
$13 2,5 ?t; :: < > " 4 "" • * -.' ., ... io'ir . : .> 4 5% per ar.:^iv:. 
1 •. rcc;*
 rropert\ -:*-- fortn .n the Partnership ~^r~<-r.r 
an asset, of the Partnership is d*
 s^ .'-. . „.v.i-
foi: - -v—: 
Beginning at a point 492.79 feet North, TU7.H7 feet ^est 
and South 8" r •*"• ' ' " " 'v.--- • -*'"t n" "in \ \ W Southeast 
corner of Section 35, Township 35 South, Range 11 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
0o15'50" East 478.24 feet; thence North 89°26f54" West 
977.99 feet; thence North 0°01f40" East 145.01 feet; 
thence North 88°09f29" West 166.74 feet; thence North 
ll052l14" East 35.0 feet; thence South 89°32l16ff West 
142.91 feet; thence North 13°20f24w East 381.93 feet; 
thence East 1189.5 feet; thence South 0°15f50n East 86.28 
feet to the point of beginning, excepting therefrom those 
areas designated as lots 10, 11, and 22 of the Plat of the 
Mobile Home Estates, a planned unit development. 
8. The above-described real property was the main asset ot the 
Partnership. 
9. By reason of the Partnership Agreement and certain 
contributions of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff became entitled to 
over 100% of the Partnership interest as of May 23, 1983. 
10. The Court specifically finds that the terms of the 
promissory note and deed of trust are superceded by the limited 
Partnership Agreement and that said agreement should govern the 
distribution of the Partnership assets. 
11. The Court specifically finds that the Plaintiff, Steven D. 
Crowther, is an appropriate person, by reason of his ownership of 
over 100% of the Partnership under the terms of the Partnership 
Agreement, to hold and manage the resources of the Partnership 
during the wind-up and sale of the Partnership assets. 
12. The fair market value of the Partnership real estate at the 
time of trial was $329,000. 
13. The evidence at trial also indicated that there were 
certain additional claims against the Defendant, Murlan D. Carter, 
by the Plaintiff in the form of accounting disputes that would 
support the need for a final accounting of the Partnership values 
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and assets to be rendered by the Court. In oirder to determine the 
amount due in order for Defendant to redeem his Partnership 
interest/property/ an accounting of Plaintiffl's management of the 
Partnership assets from May 1985 is also necessary. The accounting 
with reference to both parties will be presented in an evidentiary 
hearing before the Court prior to March 31, 1987. 
14. The Limited Partnership Agreement is unambiguous that 
Plaintiff was entitled to a 20% Partnership interest for his initial 
capital contributions listed under the first paragraphs A., B. and 
C. under paragraph 6 of the Partnership Agreement, and that any 
contributions thereafter, including the second set of lettered 
paragraphs numbered A-E under paragraph 6, would constitute 
additional contributions and result in a 1% increase in Plaintiff's 
Partnership interest for each $1,000 contributed, 
15. After May 23, 1983, the Court finds t|hat the Partnership 
continued. 
16. At no time did the parties enter into an express or 
implied agreement to terminate the Partnership other than upon 
expiration of the term of the Partnership Agreement. 
17. In accordance with the terms of the Partnership Agreement, 
Defendant has an option to reacquire the Partnership interest of the 
limited partner, by repaying to the limited partner $1,000 for each 
percentage point of ownership interest determined to have been held 
by Plaintiff at the time of trial, 125%, together with such 
additional funds, if any, as the Court may deem Appropriate as the 
reacquisition cost after the evidentiary hearinjg referred to in 
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paragraph 13 above, at any tine within five years of a particular 
contribution by the limited partner. 
18. The Court specifically finds that the parties to the 
partnership, on May 23, 1933, determined that the interest of the 
plaintiff, the linited partner, v/as worth $132,535.54 and that the 
reacquisition cost to the-d->fef^d-a^~*reirfr^ sum plus 
interest at the rate of 1.5% over the State Bank of Southern Utah 
prime lending rate. The Court further finds that the time for 
reacquisition by payment of the aforementioned $132,535.54 plus 
interest plus additional funds to be determined by the Court in the 
evidentiary accounting hearing, must be paid by the defendant to the 
plaintiff on or before May 23, 1988. 
19. Lot 8 of the Mobile Home Estates was sold to a third 
party in an arms-length transaction in the regular course of the 
partnership business, and lot 8 is no longer an asset of the 
partnership. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAU 
1. A Decree of Dissolution should be entered by this Court 
dissolving the limited partnership of the parties and providing for 
the winding up of the partnership affairs, and a distribution of 
assets pursuant to 48-2-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
and pursuant to the terms of the Linited Partnership Agreement. 
2. The defendant should be ordered to deed the real estate 
i_dentif ied_ in the Partnership Agreement to the partnership, less and 
excepting therefrom lot 8. 
3. The judgment and decree of the Court! should order that 
the plaintiff, Steven D. Crowther serve as the managing agent of 
this Court and defendant, in the form of a receiver, to manage the 
partnership assets pending sale and to make an accounting to the 
Court for the same. 
4. The decree should provide for an evidentiary hearing to 
be held before the Court prior to March 31, 1987, setting forth the 
accounting of the operation of the partnership both before and after 
the May 24, 1985 trial in this matter, in order to assist in the 
distribution of the assets of the partnership upon sale. 
5. The partnership should be authorized to sell partnership 
assets prior to May 22, 1988, at one or more prilvate sales, with 
good faith efforts made by all parties to maximize the proceeds of 
said sale or sales. The defendant is also entitled to repay the 
plaintiff by alternate means, other than the salfe of assets, 
including but not limited to refinancing all the money owed to 
plaintiff for reacquisition by the defendant of the partnership 
assets, using the partnership property as securitiy. 
6. In the event that a sale of the partnership assets cannot 
be had privately as of the reacquisition date, thlen the property 
should be sold by a Sheriff's Sale on that date and the proceeds of 
that sale divided among the partners after the accounting is 
rendered and according to the respective ounershi^ of the 
partnership assets at that time, pursuant-to-the Court's findings at 
the evidentiary hearing referred to above. 
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7. Because of the initial and additional contributions to 
the partnership nade by plaintiff, plaintiff owns approximately 125% 
of the partnership. 
8. Plaintiff is therefore the sole owner and sole partner of 
the partnership. 
9. Since plaintiff owns approximately 125% of the 
partnrer&hip,~a partnership cannot really exist and the partnership 
should be dissolved. 
10. Defendant holds title to the real estate which was the 
basis for the limited partnership operation, as the trustee of a 
constructive trust or resulting trust. 
11. A limited partner with a sole interest in the partnership 
can rename his own general partner. 
12. Plaintiff has a right to be or name another individual as 
general partner until further order of this Court. 
13. The real property identified in the Partnership Agreement 
should be deeded to the partnership from defendant. 
14. Upon payment from defendant to plaintiff of the amount to 
be determined by the Court in the evidentiary accounting hearing, 
all of defendant's obligations to plaintiff shall cease; plaintiff 
shall have no further interest in the property referred to above, 
and nlaintiff shall deed to defendant all of his interest in such 
property and assets traceable thereto. 
15. Net rental income or other income received by plaintiff 
from the property shall be applied as an offset against defendant's 
reacquisition cost after deducting expenses, including a reasonable 
cost for management. 
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16. Any sale of individual lots included in the assets of the 
Partnership shall be made upon terms acceptable to Plaintiff and 
Defendant, which acceptance will not be unreasonably withheld. Any 
private sale of an individual lot within the Mobile Home Estates for 
at least $8,500.00 shall be deemed to be acceptable. 
DATED this if/7 day of 
Robert F. Owens 
District Court Judge by 
appointment 
ozoo 
-9-
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this /caul day of March &tk 
L9 87 / I mailed a copy of the above and foregoing to the following: 
James L. Shumate, Esq. 6. Michael Westfall, Esq. 
P. 0. Box 623 P. 0. Box 367 
Cedar City, UT 84720 St. George, UT 84770 
Secretary 
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GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
G. Michael Westfall 
Attorney for Defendant 
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET 
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING 
P.. 0. Box 367 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
(801) 628-1682 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN D. CROWTHER, Trustee 
for COMPUTER SERVICE OF 
SOUTHERN UTAH PENSION TRUST, 
DECREE OF DISSOLUTION 
Plaintiff, ) AND JUDGMENT 
VS. ) 
MURLAN D. CARTER, ) 
Defendant. ) Civil! No. 85-151 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court for 
trial on May 24, 1985. The Court received arguments of counsel on 
several occasions, and after a long dispute on the final pleadings, 
on February 27, 1987, the Court made its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, signed by the Court on March 16, 1987, and now 
makes and enters the following: 
DECREE OF DISSOLUTION AND JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the C & C 
Development partnership be and the same hereby is dissolved. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the affairs of th£ C & C Development 
FIFTH 
s s s g a ^ 
mr 20 m? 
CLERK 
RB2/15 oan? 
partnership be wound up and that the Plaintiff, Steven D. Crowther 
serve as the agent of this Court and Defendant in the winding up of 
the partnership affairs and that Plaintiff provide an accounting to 
the Court of the business of the operation and the winding up of the 
partnership from and after May 24, 1985. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, Murlan D. Carter 
execute a Warranty Deed conveying to the partnership the following 
described real property less and excepting therefrom Lot 8: 
Beginning at a point 492.79 feet North, 1317.87 feet West 
and South 89°41lllft West 670.0 feet from the Southeast 
corner of Section 35, Township 35 South, Range 11 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
0°15t50n East 478.24 feet; thence North 89°26f54" West 
977.99 feet; thence North 0o01f40" East 145.01 feet; 
thence North 88o09f29,f West 166.74 feet; thence North 
11°52»14" East 35.0 feet; thence South 89°32f16" West 
142.91 feet; thence North l S ^ O ^ " East 381.93 feet; 
thence East 1189.5 feet; thence South 0o15f50n East 86.28 
feet to the point of beginning, excepting therefrom those 
areas designated as lots 10, 11, and 22 of the Plat of the 
Mobile Home Estates, a planned unit development. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Deed of Trust in the amount of 
$132,535.54 with interest thereon at the rate of 14.5% per annum, 
delivered by Defendant to Security Title Company on or about May 23, 
1983, is superceded by the Limited Partnership and it is therefore 
ordered that said Deed of Trust be released and removed from the 
subject property, described above. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the partners are entitled to sell 
the partnership assets including the above described real property 
on or before May 23, 1988, in individual lots or as a whole, at a 
private sale with good faith efforts made by both Plaintiff and 
Defendant to maximize the proceeds of said sale. 
-2-
0308 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an evidentiiry hearing be held 
within 30 days, or as soon thereafter as the Clourt is available to 
hold such hearing, in order to determine the final accounting of the 
partnership assets and the relative ownership of the partnership 
assets by the Plaintiff and Defendant at that time. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant is hereby granted an 
option to reacquire the Partnership interest of the limited partner 
by repaying to the limited partner $1,000.00 for each percentage 
point of ownership interest determined to have been held by 
Plaintiff at the time of trial, 125%, together with such additional 
funds, if any, as the Court may deem appropriate as a reacquisition 
cost after the evidentiary hearing referred to in the immediately 
preceding paragraph, at any time within five yeaits of the particular 
contribution by the limited partner. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in order to reacquire the interest 
of the Plaintiff, limited partner, in the Partnership assets, the 
Defendant must pay to Plaintiff the sum of $132,535.54, plus 
interest at the rate of 1.5% over the State Banlk of Southern Utah 
prime lending rate from and after May 23, 1983
 f subject to such 
modification to that amount as is determined by the Court in the 
evidentiary hearing referred to above. The Defendant's right to 
exercise his reacquisition rights shall extend until May 23, 1988, 
the "reacquisition date." 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any sale of individual lots included 
in the assets of the Partnership shall be made upon terms acceptable 
to Plaintiff and Defendant, which acceptance will not be 
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unreasonably withheld. Any private sale of an individual lot within 
the Mobile Home Estates for at least $8,500.00 shall be deemed to be 
acceptable. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant is entitled to repay 
the Plaintiff by alternate means, other than sale of the assets, 
including, but not limited to, refinancing all of the money owed to 
Plaintiff for reacquisition by the Defendant of the Partnership 
assets, using the Partnership property as security. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event a sale of the 
Partnership assets cannot be had privately as of the reacquisition 
date, or Defendant does not reacquire all of Plaintiff's interest in 
the Partnership assets before that date, then the property shall be 
sold at a Sheriff's Sale on that date and the proceeds of that sale 
divided among the Partners according to the respective ownership of 
the Partnership assets at that time, pursuant to the Court's 
findings at the evidentiary hearing referred to above and any 
reacquisition by Defendant of a portion of Plaintiff's interest in 
the Partnership assets. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon payment from the Defendant to 
Plaintiff of the total amount to be determined by the Court in the 
evidentiary accounting hearing, all of Defendant's obligations to 
Plaintiff shall cease; Plaintiff shall have no further interest in 
the property referred to above and Plaintiff shall deed to Defendant 
all of his interest in such property and assets traceable thereto. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that net rental income or other income 
received by the Plaintiff from the property from and after May 1985, 
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shall be applied as an offset against Defendant's reacquisition cost 
after deducting expenses, including a Seasonable cost for 
management. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Court hereby directs tjie entry of a final 
judgment as to those matters set forth above. The Court expressly 
finds that there is no just reason for dellay in the entry of 
judgment and expressly directs that judgment be entered as set forth 
above. 
DATED this 2Z day of 
District Judge Pro tern 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct unsigned copy 
of the above and foregoing DECREE OF DISSOLUTION AND JUDGMENT, to 
James L. Shumate, 110 N. Main Street, Suite P., Cedar City, UT 
84720, this /$-& day of MarS£i, 1987, first claps postage prepaid. 
Secretary 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct signed copy 
of the above and foregoing DECREE OF DISSOLUTION AND JUDGMENT, to 
James L. Shumate, 110 N. Main Street, Suite iL, Cedar City, UT 
84720, this ;3>^ day of -JMAM , 1987, first class postage 
prepaid. / 
('tomy) A Mto*uiJ 
Secretary 
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